[Ppnews] Waterboarding Endorsed In Secret Memos

[Political Prisoner News]

CIA Tactics Endorsed In Secret Memos
Waterboarding Got White House Nod
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/14/AR2008101403331_pf.html


By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, October 15, 2008; A01

The Bush administration issued a pair of secret memos to the CIA in 
2003 and 2004 that explicitly endorsed the agency's use of 
interrogation techniques such as waterboarding against al-Qaeda 
suspects -- documents prompted by worries among intelligence 
officials about a possible backlash if details of the program became public.

The classified memos, which have not been previously disclosed, were 
requested by 
then-<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/George+Tenet?tid=informline>CIA 
Director George J. Tenet more than a year after the start of the 
secret interrogations, according to four administration and 
intelligence officials familiar with the documents. Although 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Department+of+Justice?tid=informline>Justice 
Department lawyers, beginning in 2002, had signed off on the agency's 
interrogation methods, senior 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Central+Intelligence+Agency?tid=informline>CIA 
officials were troubled that 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/The+White+House?tid=informline>White 
House policymakers had never endorsed the program in writing.

The memos were the first -- and, for years, the only -- tangible 
expressions of the administration's consent for the CIA's use of 
harsh measures to extract information from captured 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Al+Qaeda?tid=informline>al-Qaeda 
leaders, the sources said. As early as the spring of 2002, several 
White House officials, including then-national security adviser 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Condoleezza+Rice?tid=informline>Condoleezza 
Rice and 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Dick+Cheney?tid=informline>Vice 
President Cheney, were given individual briefings by Tenet and his 
deputies, the officials said. Rice, in a statement to congressional 
investigators last month, confirmed the briefings and acknowledged 
that the CIA director had pressed the White House for "policy approval."

The repeated requests for a paper trail reflected growing worries 
within the CIA that the administration might later distance itself 
from key decisions about the handling of captured al-Qaeda leaders, 
former intelligence officials said. The concerns grew more pronounced 
after the revelations of mistreatment of detainees at the 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Abu+Ghraib?tid=informline>Abu 
Ghraib prison in Iraq, and further still as tensions grew between the 
administration and its intelligence advisers over the conduct of the Iraq war.

"It came up in the daily meetings. We heard it from our field 
officers," said a former senior intelligence official familiar with 
the events. "We were already worried that we" were going to be blamed.

A. John Radsan, a lawyer in the CIA general counsel's office until 
2004, remembered the discussions but did not personally view the 
memos the agency received in response to its concerns. "The question 
was whether we had enough 'top cover,' " Radsan said.

Tenet first pressed the White House for written approval in June 
2003, during a meeting with members of the 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/White+House+National+Security+Council?tid=informline>National 
Security Council, including Rice, the officials said. Days later, he 
got what he wanted: a brief memo conveying the administration's 
approval for the CIA's interrogation methods, the officials said.

Administration officials confirmed the existence of the memos, but 
neither they nor former intelligence officers would describe their 
contents in detail because they remain classified. The sources all 
spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not cleared to 
discuss the events.

The second request from Tenet, in June 2004, reflected growing 
worries among agency officials who had just witnessed the public 
outcry over the Abu Ghraib scandal. Officials who held senior posts 
at the time also spoke of deteriorating relations between the CIA and 
the White House over the war in Iraq -- a rift that prompted some to 
believe that the agency needed even more explicit proof of the 
administration's support.

"The CIA by this time is using the word 'insurgency' to describe the 
Iraq conflict, so the White House is viewing the agency with 
suspicion," said a second former senior intelligence official.

As recently as last month, the administration had never publicly 
acknowledged that its policymakers knew about the specific 
techniques, such as waterboarding, that the agency used against 
high-ranking terrorism suspects. In her unprecedented account to 
lawmakers last month, Rice, now secretary of state, portrayed the 
White House as initially uneasy about a controversial CIA plan for 
interrogating top al-Qaeda suspects.

After learning about waterboarding and similar tactics in early 2002, 
several White House officials questioned whether such harsh measures 
were "effective and necessary . . . and lawful," Rice said. Her 
concerns led to an investigation by the Justice Department's criminal 
division into whether the techniques were legal.

But whatever misgivings existed that spring were apparently overcome. 
Former and current CIA officials say no such reservations were voiced 
in their presence.

In interviews, the officials recounted a series of private briefings 
about the program with members of the administration's security team, 
including Rice and Cheney, followed by more formal meetings before a 
larger group including 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/John+Ashcroft?tid=informline>then-Attorney 
General John D. Ashcroft, then-White House counsel 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Alberto+Gonzales?tid=informline>Alberto 
R. Gonzales and then-Defense Secretary 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Donald+H.+Rumsfeld?tid=informline>Donald 
H. Rumsfeld. None of the officials recalled 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/George+W.+Bush?tid=informline>President 
Bush being present at any of the discussions.

Several of the key meetings have been previously described in news 
articles and books, but Rice last month became the first 
Cabinet-level official to publicly confirm the White House's 
awareness of the program in its earliest phases. In written responses 
to questions from the 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Senate+Committee+on+Armed+Services?tid=informline>Senate 
Armed Services Committee, Rice said Tenet's description of the 
agency's interrogation methods prompted her to investigate further to 
see whether the program violated U.S. laws or international treaties, 
according to her written responses, dated Sept. 12 and released late 
last month.

"I asked that . . . Ashcroft personally advise the NSC principles 
whether the program was lawful," Rice wrote.

Current and former intelligence officials familiar with the briefings 
described Tenet as supportive of enhanced interrogation techniques, 
which the officials said were developed by CIA officers after the 
agency's first high-level captive, al-Qaeda operative Zayn al-Abidin 
Muhammed Hussein, better known as 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Abu+Zubaida?tid=informline>Abu 
Zubaida, refused to cooperate with interrogators.

"The CIA believed then, and now, that the program was useful and 
helped save lives," said a former senior intelligence official 
knowledgeable about the events. "But in the agency's view, it was 
like this: 'We don't want to continue unless you tell us in writing 
that it's not only legal but is the policy of the administration.' "

One administration official familiar with the meetings said the CIA 
made such a convincing case that no one questioned whether the 
methods were necessary to prevent further terrorist attacks.

"The CIA had the White House boxed in," said the official. "They were 
saying, 'It's the only way to get the information we needed, and -- 
by the way -- we think there's another attack coming up.' It left the 
principals in an extremely difficult position and put the 
decision-making on a very fast track."

But others who were present said Tenet seemed more interested in 
protecting his subordinates than in selling the administration on a 
policy that administration lawyers had already authorized.

"The suggestion that someone from CIA came in and browbeat everybody 
is ridiculous," said one former agency official familiar with the 
meeting. "The CIA understood that it was controversial and would be 
widely criticized if it became public," the official said of the 
interrogation program. "But given the tenor of the times and the 
belief that more attacks were coming, they felt they had to do what 
they could to stop the attack."

The CIA's anxiety was partly fueled by the lack of explicit 
presidential authorization for the interrogation program. A secret 
White House "memorandum of notification" signed by Bush on Sept. 15, 
2001, gave the agency broad authority to wage war against al-Qaeda, 
including killing and capturing its members. But it did not spell out 
how captives should be handled during interrogation.

But by the time the CIA requested written approval of its policy, in 
June 2003, the population of its secret prisons had grown from one to 
nine, including 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Khalid+Shaikh+Mohammed?tid=informline>Khalid 
Sheik Mohammed, the alleged principal architect of the Sept. 11, 
2001, attacks. Three of the detainees had been subjected to 
waterboarding, which involves strapping a prisoner to a board, 
covering his face and pouring water over his nose and mouth to 
simulate drowning.

By the spring of 2004, the concerns among agency officials had 
multiplied, in part because of shifting views among administration 
lawyers about what acts might constitute torture, leading Tenet to 
ask a second time for written confirmation from the White House. This 
time the reaction was far more reserved, recalled two former 
intelligence officials.

"The Justice Department in particular was resistant," said one former 
intelligence official who participated in the discussions. "They said 
it doesn't need to be in writing."

Tenet and his deputies made their case in yet another briefing before 
the White House national security team in June 2004. It was to be one 
of the last such meetings for Tenet, who had already announced plans 
to step down as CIA director. Author 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Jane+Mayer?tid=informline>Jane 
Mayer, who described the briefing in her recent book, "The Dark 
Side," said the graphic accounts of interrogation appeared to make 
some participants uncomfortable. "History will not judge us kindly," 
Mayer quoted Ashcroft as saying.

Participants in the meeting did not recall whether a vote was taken. 
Several weeks passed, and Tenet left the agency without receiving a 
formal response.

Finally, in mid-July, a memo was forwarded to the CIA reaffirming the 
administration's backing for the interrogation program. Tenet had 
acquired the statement of support he sought.

Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.




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