[Ppnews] Like it or not, Mumia may get a new trial
Political Prisoner News
ppnews at freedomarchives.org
Thu May 24 11:19:29 EDT 2007
Verdict Nullification?
http://www.citypaper.net/articles/2007/05/24/verdict-nullification?userCreated=&commentPosted=0#posted
Like it or not, Mumia may get a new trial.
by Dave Lindorff
Published: May 23, 2007
When the name Mumia Abu-Jamal comes up in local
conversation, the debate immediately begins over
whether he is guilty of a murder that has kept
him on Pennsylvania's death row for 25 years.
Rarely does it address the underlying question of
whether he had a fair trial or appeal process.
Now, three 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
judges are mulling key elements that pertain to
that very crucial question. They are also
considering whether to uphold a 2001 decision by
Federal District Judge William Yohn that
overturned Abu-Jamal's death sentence for the
Dec. 9, 1981, murder of Philadelphia police officer Daniel Faulkner.
The key claim argued before the three-judge panel
during a two-and-a-half-hour hearing last
Thursday (May 17) in the packed Ceremonial
Courtroom of the federal courthouse was whether
the prosecutor at the 1982 trial, Joseph McGill,
improperly removed potential qualified jurors because of race.
In 1995, the District Attorney's office admitted
that McGill used 10 of 15 peremptory challenges
requests to strike jurors from consideration, for
which no reason has to be given to remove black
jurors who otherwise met the requirements to be
on the panel, including a willingness to vote for
death. This means that, of 14 possible qualified
African-American jurors, McGill eliminated 10.
That compares to only five white jurors that he
peremptorily dismissed out of a possible 25. And
it left Abu-Jamal's jury with nine whites and
three blacks in a city that was 44 percent black
(the gap widened when a black juror was removed
by the judge and replaced by a white alternate,
with the enthusiastic endorsement of McGill).
On its face, that would seem to be prima facie
evidence of racial discrimination that would
normally warrant a hearing, but there is more:
Over the course of six murder trials that he
tried, McGill used his peremptory challenges to
remove 74 percent of qualified black jurors,
compared to only 25 percent of white jurors.
Moreover, McGill's methods were part of a pattern
prevailing during the two terms of McGill's boss,
then D.A. Ed Rendell. Under Rendell, prosecutors
barred 58 percent of all blacks via peremptory
challenges, compared to just 22 percent of whites.
Abu-Jamal's lead attorney, Robert R. Bryan, cited
these statistics and noted that during jury
questioning, McGill asked different questions of
blacks than whites, and used different standards in deciding whom to remove.
Rather than contest the statistics and other
evidence of racial discrimination in jury
selection, Hugh Burns the head of the DA's
appeals unit, he argued the state's case against
Abu-Jamal claimed that Abu-Jamal had no right
to raise the issue in federal court. Burns
alleged that Abu-Jamal had missed his chance to
do so in 1995, during his Post-Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA) hearing, or subsequent appeal to the state supreme court.
The problem with the DA's argument? Much evidence
of race-based jury selection did not come to
light until 1998, a year after Abu-Jamal's final
appeal had been decided. Since Abu-Jamal couldn't
have had that evidence until his state appeal was
over, it was first presented in his federal habeas appeal in 1999.
A second line of appeal by Abu-Jamal, briefly
discussed at last week's hearing, was a statement
made by McGill during his summation on the last
day of the trial; he told jurors that if they had
doubts about the defendant's guilt, they needn't
worry, because, "If you find the defendant guilty
of course there would be appeal after appeal and
perhaps there could be a reversal of the case, or
whatever, so that may not be final." (Juries are
supposed to reach a guilty verdict only if the
case was proven "beyond a reasonable doubt.")
This was no slip by McGill, who used identical
language in another case, which is why the state
Supreme Court, in 1986, overturned that defendant's death sentence.
Now, Abu-Jamal is asking the appeals court to
overturn his conviction on the same grounds. He
seemed to have won some support from at least one judge, Robert Cowen.
When prosecutor Burns argued that McGill's
statement could justify only overturning a
sentence, not conviction, Cowen asked, "But isn't
what the prosecutor said a denial of [the defendant's] right to a fair trial?"
There were many problems with Abu-Jamal's trial,
his lawyers and supporters maintain. He was
provided with almost no funds for ballistics or
forensic experts. Records of interrogations show
that prosecution witnesses were pressured by
police over the course of six months to alter
their testimony to comport with the prosecution's
crime scenario. For example, white taxi driver
Robert Chobert, who originally told police the
shooter had fled the scene, later graphically
described seeing Abu-Jamal do the shooting,
execution-style. Chobert was uniquely vulnerable
to pressure from prosecutors he had been
driving on a license that had been suspended for
a DWI conviction, and was also on five-years'
probation for felony arson in the fire-bombing of
an elementary school for money. Neither this
information nor the fact that he had asked the DA
to help him "fix" his license was allowed to go to the jury.
The point is that when people develop opinions
about this controversial case, particularly in
Philadelphia, they tend to base them on the fact
of Abu-Jamal's conviction, and then, working on
the assumption that the jury accepted the facts
as presented at trial to be true, go on to
proclaim him guilty of Faulkner's murder.
What if the conviction itself, however, was the
result of a pre-selection of jurors inclined to
believe the prosecutor, think Judge Albert Sabo
was fair and believe police officers and
prosecution witnesses? And if, moreover, those
jurors were allowed to be assured by the
prosecutor that the standard for conviction
needn't be "proof beyond a reasonable doubt,"
then what certainty is there about any of the
"facts" presented at the trial, or about the verdict?
This is why the appeal now being considered by
the three judges of the 3rd Circuit Chief Judge
Anthony Scirica, Judge Cowen and Judge Thomas
Ambro is critical. If justice and the hallowed
constitutional right to a fair trial are to have
any real meaning in the United States, it is
essential that juries be chosen in a manner that
is fair, not stacked, and it is essential that if
the resulting jury convicts especially in a
capital case it be on the basis of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
As the arguments presented at the 3rd Circuit
hearing made clear, there are solid reasons to
doubt that either of those things happened in
Abu-Jamal's case. Philadelphians need to be
prepared to accept that if at least two judges on
the appeals court panel reach that conclusion,
there will be no way to convincingly argue that
Abu-Jamal "did it," until the evidence is presented fairly at a new trial.
(<mailto:editorial at citypaper.net>editorial at citypaper.net)
Dave Lindorff, a Philadelphia-area investigative
journalist and columnist, is author of Killing
Time: An Investigation into the Death Penalty
Case of Mumia Abu-Jamal (Common Courage Press, 2004).
Freedom Archives
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San Francisco, CA 94110
415 863-9977
www.Freedomarchives.org
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