[Ppnews] Guantánamo and the Supreme Court
Political Prisoner News
ppnews at freedomarchives.org
Tue Dec 4 12:15:12 EST 2007
http://www.counterpunch.org/worthington12042007.html
December 4, 2007
The Most Important Habeas Corpus Case in Modern History
Guantánamo and the Supreme Court
By ANDY WORTHINGTON
As the Supreme Court prepares once more to
consider whether the detainees at Guantánamo have
habeas corpus rights -- a cornerstone of
civilization and a principle established 800
years ago in England, giving prisoners the right
to challenge the basis of their detention in
court -- Andy Worthington looks at the key
arguments in what Law.com has described as
"perhaps the most important habeas corpus case in modern history."
On December 5, the nine justices of the Supreme
Court will hear arguments from the government,
represented by a team led by US Solicitor General
Paul D. Clement, and from lawyers for the
detainees, whose cases -- Al Odah v. United
States and Boumediene v. Bush -- will be put
forward by Seth P. Waxman, a former US Solicitor
General, who is now a partner in the law firm
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr. The
detainees' main briefs are backed up by more than
two dozen amicus briefs looking at various
aspects of the cases, which have been filed by a
wide range of legal experts, including such
veterans of the Guantánamo legislation as Michael
Ratner of the Center for Constitutional Rights,
and Tom Wilner of Shearman and Sterling.
At stake is whether or not Congress acted
unconstitutionally in passing the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), which established
Military Commissions to try "enemy combatants"
held at Guantánamo, and also stripped the US
courts of their right to hear habeas corpus
petitions filed by the Guantánamo detainees.
The MCA was itself a response to two previous
Supreme Court decisions: Rasul v. Bush, in June
2004, and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in June 2006. In
Rasul, the justices ruled, by a majority of 6-3,
that the Guantánamo prisoners had the right to
challenge the legal limbo in which they were
held, and demolished the administration's
long-cherished belief that Guantánamo (which was
specifically chosen as the venue for a "War on
Terror" prison because it was presumed to be
beyond the reach of the US courts) did not count
as US territory. "They are not nationals of
countries at war with the United States," the
judges declared, "and they deny that they have
engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against
this country; they have never been afforded
access to any tribunal, much less charged with
and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than
two years they have been imprisoned in territory
over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control."
In his majority opinion, Justice John Paul
Stevens emphasized the importance of habeas
corpus, citing a 1945 case in which it was
described as "a writ antecedent to statute ...
throwing its roots deep into the genius of our
common law," and a 1953 case dealing specifically
with the detention of aliens in US custody:
"Executive imprisonment has been considered
oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymede,
pledged that no free man should be imprisoned,
dispossessed, outlawed or exiled save by the
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
The judges of England developed the writ of
habeas corpus largely to preserve these immunities from executive restraint."
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which focused on the case
of Salim Hamdan, a Yemeni who was one of Osama
bin Laden's drivers in Afghanistan, the Supreme
Court delivered an equally damning verdict on the
legitimacy of putting the detainees forward for
trial by Military Commission. This system of show
trials was dreamt up by Vice President Dick
Cheney and his advisors, including David
Addington, and established in a document known as
Military Order No. 1, which was approved with no
Congressional oversight whatsoever in November
2001. It authorized indefinite detention without
due process for "enemy combatants," and
established ground rules for the Commissions that
drew widespread criticism from lawyers and human
rights activists, for several obvious reasons.
These included the fact that the juries and
presiding officers would be hand-picked by the
administration, that evidence obtained through
hearsay or torture would be allowed, and that
both the accused and his lawyers could be
prevented from seeing certain evidence.
By a majority of 5-3, the justices ruled that
that the Military Commissions were illegal under
US law and the Geneva Conventions. Concluding
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
which forbids "cruel treatment and torture" and
"outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment," was
"applicable" to Hamdan and others facing Military
Commissions, Justice Stevens stated that it was
Hamdan's right to be tried by a "regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples." By confirming the
importance of Common Article 3, the Supreme Court
struck at the heart of the administration's novel
and unprecedented flight from domestic and
international law. Justice Anthony Kennedy
spelled out this position even more clearly,
warning the administration that "violations of
Common Article 3 are considered 'war crimes,'
punishable as federal offences, when committed by
United States nationals and military personnel."
In the case of Rasul v. Bush, the government
responded by allowing the detainees to have
access to lawyers, for the first time in over two
and a half years of isolated detention, but
ignored the main thrust of the verdict -- that
they should have access to the US courts -- by
establishing military reviews at Guantánamo,
known as Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs), which were blatantly unlawful. Designed
to review whether the detainees had been
correctly designated as "enemy combatants" when
they arrived in US custody (mostly between 2001
and 2003, and mostly delivered by the US
military's allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan at
a time when bounty payments for al-Qaeda and
Taliban suspects were prevalent), the CSRTs
prevented the detainees from being represented by
lawyers, and, like the Commissions, relied on
classified evidence, which was not revealed to
the detainees and which, moreover, was just as
readily obtained through the torture, coercion and bribery of other detainees.
In response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the government
seized on a comment made by Justice Stephen
Breyer -- "Nothing prevents the President from
returning to Congress to seek the authority he
believes necessary [to reestablish the
Commissions]" -- by doing just that, pushing the
MCA through a supine Congress just three months
later, reestablishing the reviled Military
Commissions and, for good measure, stripping the
detainees of their habeas rights.
Although the MCA was challenged in April this
year, when the justices of the Supreme Court
chose to delay judgment on the cases, allowing
time for a limited review of the detainees' cases
to proceed under the terms of the Detainee
Treatment Act (another flawed piece of
anti-terror legislation, passed in 2005), the
road to Wednesday's momentous Supreme Court
hearing opened up just two months later, when,
reversing itself for the first time in 60 years,
the Supreme Court agreed to hear the detainees'
arguments once more. Commentators credited this
extraordinary change of heart to the explosive
revelations contained in an affidavit filed in
Al-Odah v. United States by Lt. Col. Stephen
Abraham, a military intelligence officer with 20
years' experience, who was involved in compiling the "evidence" for the CSRTs.
In a comprehensive hatchet job, Lt. Col. Abraham
described the tribunals as severely flawed,
relying on intelligence "of a generalized nature
-- often outdated, often 'generic,' rarely
specifically relating to the individual subjects
of the CSRTs or to the circumstances related to
those individuals' status." In addition, he
insisted that the process was designed to
rubber-stamp the detainees' prior designation as
"enemy combatants," and this was confirmed when
it became apparent that several detainees had
been subjected to repeat CSRTs when the verdict
in the first did not meet with the
administration's approval. Lt. Col. Abraham later
revealed that two of his former colleagues had
supported his statements, and in September
another whistleblower, an Army major who had been
a tribunal member on 49 of the 558 CSRTs, also
spoke out, confirming Abraham's complaints about
both the gathering of intelligence and the reconvening of tribunals.
The revelations of Lt. Col. Abraham and his
colleagues have returned the issue of the
detainees' indefinite detention to center stage,
just as it was three and a half years ago in
Rasul v. Bush. In his argument on Wednesday, Seth
Waxman will explain that the MCA is
unconstitutional, and will point out that rulings
made by the Supreme Court back in the summer of
2004 are still applicable. His brief states that,
in Rasul, "this court ruled that noncitizens
detained by the United States military at
Guantánamo Bay have access to the writ of habeas
corpus, a conclusion informed by the Court's
analysis of the common law writ," and that the
government has offered "no persuasive rebuttal to
the Court's reading of history." Waxman's brief
also refutes "the government's reliance on cases
declining to grant habeas relief" as they relate
to "prisoners of war," and he reiterates the
point made by the Supreme Court in Rasul:
"Petitioners maintain that they are not enemy
soldiers subject to military detention. Unlike
prisoners of war in traditional armed conflicts
-- where it is usually clear or undisputed that
the prisoners are in fact detainable enemy
soldiers -- Petitioners are civilians from a
friendly nation who were abducted by the
government far from any theater of war and have
never engaged in armed hostilities against the United States."
Whilst it seems from this argument that the
Supreme Court will have no choice but to
reiterate its 2004 verdict, Joanna Mariner,
Terrorism and Counterterrorism Director at Human
Rights Watch, has pointed out that the justices
are in fact being asked to decide "whether
prisoners at Guantánamo enjoy a constitutional
right of habeas corpus (in other words, whether
the Rasul decision was grounded in the
Constitution, or whether it had mere statutory
grounds)." If they agree that habeas corpus is a
constitutional right -- as the Constitution's
Framers clearly intended it to be, ruling that it
can only be suspended in "cases of rebellion or
invasion" -- Mariner notes that they may then
assess not only whether Congress "meant to
suspend the right," but whether, indeed, the
nation's politicians actually "had the power to
do so." Mariner also observes that the justices
may rule on whether Congress, in allowing for
limited federal court review of the CSRTs (in the
Detainee Treatment Act), has provided the
detainees with an "adequate substitute" for the
right of habeas corpus, which, as she adds, is
where "kangaroo courts" -- the tribunals, as
demolished by Lt. Col. Abraham -- "come into the picture."
Although no decision is expected before spring
2008, tomorrow's hearing is indeed of colossal
importance, not only to the detainees in
Guantánamo, many of whom are about to start their
seventh year of imprisonment without charge or
trial, but also to the government's assertion
that it is entitled to pursue these policies
without any significant judicial oversight. As
Britain's Financial Times noted in a recent
editorial, "American democracy is based on the
optimistic notion that all three branches of
government will not do the wrong thing, all at
the same time. The president and even Congress
might step over the line -- but if they do, the
US Supreme Court is there to restore the rule of
law over the mistakes of men."
Although the Bush administration has attempted to
shift the Supreme Court to the right, and to its
own point of view, in its two most recent
appointments, the justices have repeatedly shown,
as Suzanna Sherry, a professor at Vanderbilt
University Law School, explained, that their job
is "to balance the need to prevent terrorism with
individual rights." They are also clearly aware
of their own right not to be shunted aside by an
executive that demands the freedom to operate
without any restraint whatsoever. Dennis
Hutchinson, a professor at the University of
Chicago Law School, summed up this attitude in a
single line that those campaigning for the
detainees' rights must be hoping is particularly
applicable: "The Court doesn't like to be told,
'You don't have a role to play here.'"
Andy Worthington is a British historian, and the
author of
'<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0745326641/counterpunchmaga>The
Guantánamo Files: The Stories of the 774
Detainees in America's Illegal Prison' (to be
published by Pluto Press in October 2007). Visit
his website at: <http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/>www.andyworthington.co.uk
He can be reached at:
<mailto:andy at andyworthington.co.uk>andy at andyworthington.co.uk
Freedom Archives
522 Valencia Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
415 863-9977
www.Freedomarchives.org
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