

BULLETIN

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC : TWO YEARS LATER

By Asdrubel Dominguez and Jose Cuello

[The authors of this article are members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Dominican Republic. Readers will recall that the pretext for the massive U. S. invasion of Santo Domingo in 1965 by tens of thousands of troops was to smash a subversive plot by "52 communists." The editors of the *Bulletin* call your attention especially to the final passages of the article which tell of preparation for revolutionary armed struggle and the mention of cooperation with the struggle developing in Haiti, which occupies the western portion of the island of Hispaniola. In view of what is shaping up as a coordinated continental struggle in Southern Africa against imperialism, we would refer you to the April 1968 *Bulletin* on the beginnings of Haitian armed struggle, to demonstrate the possibility of a similar development in this hemisphere.—*The Editors.*]

What has happened to the powerful revolutionary movement that in April 1965 destroyed the reactionary structure of the Dominican state and compelled the U. S. government to resort to open armed intervention? . . .

After the cessation of hostilities, the United States, whose prestige had been gravely impaired by the intervention, imposed "elections" upon a people who had already demonstrated their will during the uprising. The aim of this subterfuge was to cover the blood that had been spilled with the threadbare cloth of representative democracy and to ensure counter-revolutionary stability.

Only two candidates contested the presidency— Bosch, supported by the armed people, and Balaguer, an agent of imperialism brought in from New York for the express purpose of contesting the election, the only man of the Dominican Right who had not brought upon himself the wrath of the people, and this solely because he hadn't happened to be in the country when the U. S. Marines landed.

The dilemma that now faced our Party was either to boycott the election, held under the pressure and control of the invader, or to support the candidate who personified the nationalist and democratic sentiments of the people, and at the same time to explain our own program and tactics. We opted for the latter, but not because we believed that the ballot-papers would help us impose upon imperialism the democratic and nationalist solution which a year earlier the invader had opposed with guns

Towards the beginning of June, a few days after the voting, came the surprising announcement of Balaguer's victory.

The moment the first proofs of a fraud became apparent, our Party organized a powerful protest campaign. But the Social-Christians and later Bosch himself, having expressed reservations about the conduct and official results of the election, gave up the fight for recognition of the victory of the democratic candidate.

The electoral farce showed that the striving of the masses for a particular solution is not enough; needed are the means with which to secure it. . . .

The Balaguer government came to power with a program for strengthening the reactionary state and the classes supporting it, making it even more dependent on imperialism, a program aimed at disorganizing and destroying the revolutionary forces. This is reason enough to regard this government as bourgeois-landlord, pro-imperialist and counter-revolutionary.

In the economic sphere, its chief aim is to abolish the public sector, which accounts for 45 per cent of all invested capital and which emerged as a result of the confiscation of the Trujillo family's property. . . .

The government has abolished the Dominican Sugar Corporation, which means that the national sugar refineries are up for sale, and announced the sale of state trading establishments. The State Bank is also likely to go into private hands.

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Santo Domingo, April 1965:
The Handwriting is on the Wall

INTERVIEW WITH MOZAMBIQUE LIBERATION SPOKESMAN - pp. 4-5

OKINAWA: America's Colony in the Pacific

World War II ended 23 years ago, yet the United States continues its military occupation of the islands of Okinawa. Situated in the center of an arc beginning from Japan and Korea in the North, to Southeast Asia through Taiwan, Okinawa is a convenient advanced base for the U. S. aggression in Vietnam. Okinawa would be of critical value in any aggression against the People's Republic of China, particularly since nuclear weapons could be stockpiled and used without the permission of the local government. As a training site for guerilla warfare and as a center for intelligence activities in Southeast Asia, Okinawa is of incomparable value.

The United States has not failed to take every advantage of the military "usefulness" of the islands. One quarter of the total area of the islands (2,384 sq.km.) is used by the U. S. military (46% of all formerly arable land), and since the escalation of the war in Vietnam, the U. S. has attempted to expand even further. In February 1966, the military had 117 bases on Okinawa: the Army 65, Navy 13, Marine Corps 15 and Air Force 24.

But U. S. domination does not end at the edges of its bases. Okinawa is under the full administrative control of the U. S. military, from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President, through the Department of Defense. Head of the civil administration is the "High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands," who is selected from the active duty members of the U. S. armed forces. The chief executive of the Okinawan civil government can be dismissed by the American High Commissioner.

Prior to occupation, Okinawa was a prefecture of Japan. Although historically and culturally linked with Japan, before 1868 the islands had been called the Ryukyu Kingdom. In 1868, they became an official part of Japan. Nevertheless, the U. S. government insists on identifying Okinawa as "Ryukyu" in order to give the impression that the area is not part of Japan.

U. S. control of Okinawa is complete. The currency of the islands is the U. S. dollar. A person from either Okinawa or mainland Japan, wishing to travel between the islands and the mainland, must submit an application in English to the U. S. authorities. Permission is not automatically granted. The leader of the opposition party in Okinawa applied 17 times before he was granted permission to travel to the mainland of his own country. Neither Japanese law nor Constitution apply to Okinawa and the local administration has no jurisdiction over U. S. servicemen committing crimes against Okinawans. In fact, heavy restrictions are placed on Okinawan police regarding the arrest of American servicemen. When brought to trial by U. S. authorities, the accused are usually found "not guilty", sometimes on grounds as wild as "mistaken for a wild boar" or "mistaken for a bird."

Occupation of Japanese territory could not, of course, happen without the cooperation of the Japanese government. The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 stipulates in Article Three that the U. S. is to have "all rights over administration, legislation and jurisdiction" until the question is brought before the U. N. Japan has never demanded the return of its territory which is its right under the U. N. Charter. Article Six of the same San Francisco Treaty provides for the withdrawal of U. S. troops except in consequence of a bilateral agreement with Japan.

In return for Japan's acquiescence, the U. S. strengthened the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty. Japanese industry benefits from the demand for equipment for U. S. soldiers, particularly since the build-up of the Vietnam War, and the U. S. encourages Japanese business to invest in Okinawa, providing a guaranteed return of profits and a "free remittance system" for the dollar earned on the islands.

Okinawa has become economically dependent on the mainland. There is an unfavorable balance of trade of about \$230 million, import items including facilities and materials to meet the special demands of the Vietnam war, mainland-manufactured washing machines, refrigerators, televisions, etc. Exports are mainly raw sugar and canned pineapple.

A colonial type of one-crop system has been developing in agriculture. With the U. S. military now occupying 46% of formerly arable land, wrenched away from the peasants by force, farmers have been forced to decrease their acreage under cultivation and convert from diversified farming to the cultivation of sugar and pineapple. Many have sought employment elsewhere. The percentage of Okinawans engaged in agriculture dropped from 57% in 1957 to 36.3% in 1965. The destruction of agriculture has rendered the people more dependent on U. S. bases and services to the military for their livelihood.

Conditions for workers are also worsening due to the "special Vietnam procurements" boom now prevailing over the entire industry of Okinawa. A typical working day is 10 hours at 19¢ an hour (at Fischer's) and 24¢ an hour for technicians (at Pacific Aircon). Port workers sometimes labor more than 16 hours a day at 38¢ an hour.


On military bases, the number of workers has remained constant though the amount of work has doubled to meet the Vietnam war requirements. Ordinance No. 116 (Labor Relations and Labor Standards Concerning Ryukyuan Employees) has stripped workers of the right to strike and collective bargaining.

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions report in 1956 demonstrated the existence of a segregationist wage system. Americans received from \$1.20 to \$6.52 an hour, Philipinos from 52¢ to \$1.04, Japanese (mainland) from 83¢ to \$2.90 and "Ryukyuan" 10¢.

Commodity prices are rising rapidly. A rise of 6% in overall prices was reported in 1965, with a rise of 15.8% in California rice, the staple food of the people. Increased exports to Vietnam, monopoly prices and heavy taxes were major factors. Although taxes are high, exemptions are made for Americans with the result that a well-paid American pays less for a commodity than a poorly-paid Okinawan.

Military concerns take a much higher priority than decent living conditions for the people of Okinawa. Villagers are subjected to the deafening roar from the U. S. Airforce bases, sometimes reaching 120 phons, the maximum tolerable to the human ear. Fresh water can no longer be drawn from wells that have been poisoned by waste oil. Stray bullets and blind shells have killed and wounded people and destroyed their homes.

The people have been further denied their rights and freedoms through ordinances proclaimed by the U. S. High



U.S. Bases in Okinawa

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Commissioner. In addition to the ordinance denying the right to strike (mentioned above), Ordinance No. 144 (Code of Penal Law and Procedure) permits search without warrant by the U.S. Army executive authorities for judicial affairs; Ordinance No. 132 (Certain Parades and Processions Prohibited or Subject to Permit), now almost ignored due to increased resistance, puts a ban on any demonstration of more than 50 people. The U.S. military government's Special Proclamation No. 23 (Political Parties) reserves the right for it to dissolve any political party by stipulating that "distribution of comments or publications harmful to the policy of the Military Government should be forbidden."

When Kamejiro Senaga, chairman of the opposition Okinawa People's Party, was elected mayor of Naha City, the U.S. forces froze the funds of the city and ordered the City Assembly to pass a no-confidence resolution. When these and other measures were not effective, U.S. authorities issued an ordinance to remove the mayor from office.

The Okinawan people are demanding that the islands be restored to the mainland. The movement has developed great force since the 1950's when it began with the peasants' resistance to U.S. expropriation of their land. The peasants are today preventing the U.S. from grabbing any more territory to service its escalation of the Vietnam War. The struggle is now led by the workers who prevented the U.S. from sending Okinawans to Vietnam.

On the mainland as well, the movement has grown particu-

larly in connection with the fight against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. More than 50 organizations have come together within the framework of the Central Working Committee for the Return of Okinawa.

The Japanese and U.S. governments have been busy preparing the Japanese people to accept the maintenance of nuclear bases on Okinawa. Premier Sato's government has tried to deceive the people about its interest in restoring Okinawa to the mainland by making vague statements about discussions taking place "within a few years". At the same time the Japanese government is strengthening its own militarism.

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is up for renewal in 1970. Pressure has been mounting for the abrogation of this Treaty and of Articles Three and Six of the San Francisco Peace Treaty establishing the U.S. occupation of Okinawa. These aims are particularly relevant in light of the Vietnam War.

This year 1968 is the most important year for the opposition to the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam and for support of the Vietnamese people. At the same time it is also the most important year for the struggle for the immediate, unconditional and total restoration of Okinawa.

[This article is based on the Special January-February 1968 issue of *No More Hiroshimas* (Tokyo), published by the Japan Council Against A and H Bombs.]

MOZAMBIQUE: ONE MILLION P

[Below is the text of an interview granted the Tri-Continental Information Bulletin by Mr. Sharfudine Kahn, representative of FRELIMO, the Mozambique Liberation Front.]

Q. Briefly, what is the history of the Portuguese involvement in Mozambique and how is the country currently governed?

A. The Portuguese navigator, Vasco da Gama, stopped on Mozambique Island in March 1498 en route to India, as did Alvares Cabral in 1500. (Cabral, by the way, "discovered" Brazil.) These were not the first foreigners to come to the area, however, as Arabs and Indians had already travelled extensively through the region. The actual beginning of Portugal's involvement came in 1505 when she occupied the country militarily, assigned the first Captain of the colony and sent missionaries.

Despite this, Portugal did not really establish her administrative control until the 1884 conference in Berlin where the western powers settled their differences and sliced up the area. Portugal emerged from this conference dissatisfied since she had claimed a much greater territory, but she had to be content with the areas comprising Angola and Mozambique in southern Africa and Portuguese Guinea and Saint Tomes Prince Islands in the west.

During this time, the Mozambique people resisted Portuguese control and a number of Western powers sold armaments to the movement but Portugal was able to close off this supply route through an agreement made at the so-called "Peace" Conference held in Paris in 1919.

Thus it was with the cooperation of the Allies that in 1922 Portugal succeeded in imposing complete domination on Mozambique, introducing into law the exploitation of land, a sovereignty tax and forced labor.

Today the country is directly controlled by Portugal. Every decision must be approved by the central government which does not include one African from Mozambique. This system is so cumbersome that even some of Portugal's own Ministers suggested some decentralization for the country so that it could develop itself more efficiently. These Ministers have been forced out of the government because of their disagreement with Salazar on this issue.

The extent of Portuguese domination can be seen in the fact that Africans are permitted to form no political parties.

Q. Under what conditions do the masses of people live, both in the cities and in the countryside?

A. Aside from a small group of civil servants, the people live under conditions that I can only describe as indecent, although there are slight differences between the conditions in the countryside and those in the cities. The utter disregard of the Portuguese for the Africans is demonstrated by the 98% illiteracy rate in a country where a primary school education is a requirement for citizenship. Africans are on the level of servants to the white people and many have fled to South Africa, Rhodesia, and other neighboring countries.

An African has no right to own land. He must carry an identity card registering where he works and if he has no specific employment, the authorities can pick him up off the street and send him wherever laborers are needed. In this way, plantations are cultivated through forced labor.


There is some light industry and dockwork, but wages are extremely low. Unemployment is high and in fact becoming more acute because the intensification of the resistance struggle is discouraging investments.

Medical facilities are very poor. Even in the capital, Lourenco Marques, there is only one hospital which serves the city and much of the countryside.

There are over 100,000 settlers in a population of 7,000,000 and the standard of living for any European is 10 times higher than that of the most well-off African. Even the *assimilados*, some 5-6000 privileged Africans, could not be considered a "middle-class" and yet each African must pay a "sovereignty" tax to the Portuguese for the privilege of being alive.

Q. What is the history of the resistance movement prior to the formation of FRELIMO?

A. Resistance against the Portuguese has always existed in Mozambique. Prior to 1922, when the Portuguese imposed administrative control, the struggle was organized by the local rulers, the most important action taking place in the Zambezi area during the 16th century. But the real resistance began in the 19th century. We can recall the campaign in Vathwa, headed by the great Captain Maguiguana, who was not defeated until his fourth battle in 1897. He had organized one of the most significant campaigns after the Chief of the Vathwas had been imprisoned by the Portuguese. We also saw a very determined struggle in the area of Namarroi in 1918 which lasted 10 months, the Portuguese



KUDRA-KUCERA IN DIKOBRAZ (PRAGUE)

OPLE IN THE LIBERATION ZONE

victory coming only after the "Peace" conference in Paris, which I mentioned before, when other Western powers stopped selling arms to our people.

Even after Portugal imposed its administration on our country, the resistance continued. Spontaneous uprisings occurred in 1924 and 1939 and sporadic fighting was seen from time to time after that.

Unarmed Mozambican workers attempted to express their demands through strikes and demonstrations, but the Portuguese ruthlessly suppressed them. In one instance in 1960, Portugal massacred 600 people in a public demonstration in Caba Delgado. In the 1963 dockworkers strike, numerous arrests were made and the leaders "disappeared." Yet none of the people's demands were met.

We can thank the Portuguese, however, for destroying the tribal structure in Mozambique. Their purpose, of course, was to bend our will, but we have benefited from the unity that has resulted.

Many people fled the country and formed political parties in exile: MANO in Nyasaland (now Malawi), UNAMI in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and Kenya, and UDENAMO in Southern Rhodesia (now Rhodesia) and South Africa. The aim of all these organizations was simple: total liberation of Mozambique.

Q. What is FRELIMO and what are its basic aims?

A. FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front) is the continuation of our ancestor's resistance. It was formed in 1962 by the merger of MANO, UNAMI and UDENAMO in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. In September 1962, a Congress of the Front adopted the following program of action: 1) to begin diplomatic activities aimed at convincing Portugal through peaceful means to grant Mozambique independence; 2) simultaneously to prepare the people for armed struggle in case, as we supposed, the Portuguese refused a peaceful solution. The next two years were spent in this way, exerting diplomatic pressure on the Portuguese while at the same time preparing our people. In 1964, armed struggle was initiated.

FRELIMO's aim is simple: liberation. No one who shares this aim is excluded. There is no discrimination on the basis of religion, belief, color or origin.

Q. What general strategy has been employed and how successful have you been, particularly in terms of gaining popular support?

A. We have been very conscious of the need for adequate political education to prepare the people for armed struggle. The propaganda efforts, accomplished through an underground movement, have been directed toward the goals: unite, mobilize and educate the people politically.

This has occurred not only in the North where the actual fighting has been concentrated, but also in the South. That FRELIMO has been active even in the capital, Lourenco Marques, can be seen by the following: 1) the largest African organization, the Center Association for Negroes, was banned because there were signs of sympathy towards

FRELIMO; 2) intellectuals have been imprisoned; 3) specialized saboteurs from FRELIMO have appeared in the city and have had no difficulty finding hiding places.

One million people live in the liberated zone which represents one fifth of the total area of the country. In one third of the country, there is guerilla activity. In those areas controlled by FRELIMO, people work the land cooperatively and receive tools and assistance from the Front.

Q. Have you coordinated your movement with the liberation struggles in other Portuguese colonies? in South Africa, South West Africa and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)?

A. The Conference of Nationalist Movements of Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) was organized in 1961 in Morocco to accomplish coordination among the movements: CLSTP of Saint Tomes, PAIGC of Guinea, MPLA of Angola and, at that time, UDENAMO of Mozambique, now, of course, FRELIMO.

We have no ties of this sort as yet with the South African, South West African and Zimbabwean movements, but we certainly are coordinated.

Q. How has the Salazar government attempted to deal with your organization, particularly in light of its growing popularity and success?

A. The Salazar government has always refused to deal with our organization which she does not recognize officially, claiming that we do not represent the people of Mozambique. She regards us, who are fighting for our sacred rights and our independence, as "rebels" or "a handful of discontented people" instigated by the neighboring countries of "communist" orientation.

But the Portuguese not only refuse to deal with FRELIMO as the sole representative of the Mozambican people; they reject completely the idea of Mozambican independence. Portugal fails to understand that Mozambique and its people have never been part and parcel of Europe, but part and parcel of Africa, and therefore must be free from the colonial yoke.

The Portuguese remain intransigent. Last November, Dr. Nogueira, their Minister of Foreign Affairs, said here in New York: "Regarding our Overseas Provinces, we are not going to alter or modify our policy even if we go to pieces."

In their attempt to stay the liberation march of FRELIMO, Portugal increased the number of Portuguese troops from 25,000 to 60,000 between 1964 and 1967 and South African soldiers have been brought into Mozambique.

In the light of FRELIMO's growing popularity and success, the Portuguese government can no longer hide its concern over the challenge with FRELIMO present today. FRELIMO's activities touch the vital chords of Portugal's economy with the result that the cost of living is getting higher every day. A terrible feeling of insecurity is overcoming the white settlers, but for our people, these activities have raised their consciousness and boosted their confidence in the organization. The people are confident that they will gain their victory against Portuguese colonialism.

DOMINICAN COMMUNISTS: "The Duty of Our Party is to Accomplish Revolution"

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Since the home bourgeoisie lack the means with which to buy the property coming under the hammer, foreign investments seem likely to grow to an extent that will signify a qualitative change in the character of our country's dependence on imperialism. Moreover, the government grants conditions and guarantees to foreign investors that are tantamount to betrayal of the national interest.

In agriculture the government pursued a policy aimed at strengthening some of the rural strata—not by dividing up the semi-feudal latifundias, however, but by abolishing the state-owned farms run in a capitalist way. The existence of these farms, well-equipped and efficient, is a precondition for revolutionary economic development in our country along socialist lines. Hence, for Balaguer, abolition of the state farms is as important as the abolition of the state sector in industry and trade. At the same time Balaguer hopes to create a stratum of well-to-do peasants attached to their newly-acquired property and thus to prevent growth of democratic consciousness in the countryside.

Politically the Balaguer government is directed and controlled by U. S. officials.

U. S. Ambassador Crimmins attends all meetings of the cabinet. Hundreds of American officers are advisers in the armed forces. Colonel Van Jeslin, head of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, has ordered that advisers be attached to Dominican army troops for an instruction program identical to that begun in South Vietnam in 1960.

Seeking to suppress democratic sentiment in the armed forces, the government is expelling all officers, NCOs and privates suspected of implication in the April 1965 fight for democracy and national sovereignty. Intensive anti-communist brainwashing is conducted in the army and the police. Special shock units are being formed against the guerrillas and the democrats in the town. . . .

Hundreds of participants in the revolutionary movement have been murdered or have disappeared without trace in the police stations and in army barracks.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, the government has declared that the actions of the "inter-American Peace Forces" in Santo Domingo were correct and that it is in agreement with converting these forces into a permanent institution. Like Brazil, it has refused to sign the Latin American nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Public indignation alone prevented it from shipping cement to Saigon. . . .

Disagreements around the methods to be used by the counter-revolution led to a split in the Balaguer Reformist Party, and later to intensive ultra-Right conspiratorial activities. General Wessin, together with a group of epauletted assassins who made common cause with the U. S. soldiery, now heads the wilder anti-communists.

To thwart the imperialists' design to depict Balaguer as a cushion between two "extremes," i.e., Wessin and the Communists, our Party in addition to denouncing the Balaguer regime is combating it; it is alerting the people to the danger

of a violent Indonesian-type coup by Wessin. Calling for the downfall of Balaguer, we tell the people that the issue is not one of choosing between Balaguer's pseudo-constitutional pose and the "Messiah of Democracy" as Wessin calls himself—they are two sides of one and the same medal. The Party insists on an independent, national, democratic, revolutionary solution.

Big changes have taken place in the national-democratic forces. The revolutionary convulsion affected not only the bourgeois institutions, where a crisis set in, but the revolutionary parties too. Everything obsolete and acting as an impediment to the realization of the tasks set by history had to be discarded. . . .

In the organizational sphere, it was necessary to strengthen unity with the groups and parties destined by history to accomplish the task of national liberation. . . .

In the ideological sphere, it was necessary to analyze the character of the forces which in April 1965, motivated by democratic or nationalist convictions, while they resisted the American intervention were not aware of the need for consistent struggle against imperialism. . . .

Thanks to our independent international policy, we have been able to resist the anti-unity trends which at one time seemed on the way to gaining ascendancy in the entire Dominican revolutionary movement. This policy has enabled our Party to make clear the essence of proletarian internationalism. We maintained that the independence of each party furthers the success of the international working class to the extent that it increases the effectiveness of revolutionary struggle. The duty of our Party, to accomplish revolution in our country, obliges us to pursue national tactics not dependent on the foreign or domestic policy of other fraternal parties. . . .

This policy has revitalized and strengthened our Party. Its numerical strength and its influence have grown considerably.

Our Party, to which armed struggle and self-criticism imparted new strength, successfully withstood the reprisals and prevented the appearance of cracks in its ranks which could be exploited by the enemy. . . .

The policy of joint action by the different social and political forces against a common enemy requires a very serious approach to, and theoretical clarity in, the methodology of the struggle. . . . Our approach to this is based on categorical rejection of concepts which presuppose antagonism between "armed struggle" and "mass struggle"; we regard this posing of the issue as senseless, unwarranted and utterly contrary to the realities of our country (and we think, of the entire continent). . . .

Our Party knows from the bitter experience of April 1965 that we cannot regard ourselves as the vanguard if we do not prepare for the eventuality of the revolution taking the way of armed struggle. If, at the moment the bourgeoisie and imperialism set in motion the machinery of armed counter-revolution, the Communist Party fails to adapt its

The Facts About Rhodesia's 'Independence'

On November 11, 1965, Prime Minister Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesian independence from Britain (UDI). Rhodesia had repeatedly rejected the British terms for independence which included some provision in the Rhodesian constitution for the eventual enfranchisement of the black majority. The British response to UDI was the imposition of oil sanctions which was followed in December 1966 by the widening of sanctions under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council.

Independence for Rhodesia has meant independence for the white minority and the perpetuation of the already existing system of white supremacy. In a country with a population of 4,080,000 Africans (black) and 224,000 Europeans (white), the Africans have 15 seats in the legislature and the Europeans 50 seats; the Africans are apportioned 40 million acres of land and the Europeans 36 million (forcing sixteen times as many people to live on the Tribal Trust land [for Africans] as in the European Areas); in education, the expenditure per pupil is \$29.79 for an African and \$382.92 for a European; the average annual income for an African is \$360, whereas for a European, it is \$3,700.

The Law and Order Maintenance Act and the Unlawful Organization Act forbid gatherings, political meetings and demonstrations for Africans and the two major African political parties ZAPU and ZANU have been outlawed. The Minister of Justice has the legal power of Preventative Detention with the result that 3,000 Africans are in "restriction," 800 in "detention" and 1,700 in jail for various political offenses, with 70 prisoners under sentence of death.

It is now more than two years since the imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia, yet the Smith government has remained intransigent. Failure to implement consistently the sanctions campaign has been a major factor. British and U.S. owned oil has been smuggled into the country by South Africa and Portugal, and Rhodesian goods have been transported by Western European companies, including British firms, under forged labels and with false certificates of origin. Although Rhodesian exports have fallen from \$500 million in 1965 to \$224 million in 1966, *The New York Times* (December 11, 1966) estimated that U.S. imports from Rhodesia had actually increased from \$15 million to \$19 million in that same period.

Pressure must be mounted to ensure more vigorous enforcement of U. N. sanctions by member states. An air lift could be arranged for Zambia, whose communications are directed southwards through Rhodesia, to enable her to cut trade with Rhodesia without risking economic strangulation. The United States and British governments should prevent Caltex, Mobil and Shell, British Petroleum from continuing to sell and refine petroleum products in South Africa as long as South Africa supplies Rhodesia.

These actions would be consistent with the official policy of the U. S. toward Rhodesia. In 1966, President Johnson said "We will not support policies abroad that are based on the rule of minorities on the discredited notion that men are unequal before the law." Ambassador Goldberg, in a letter to the *Washington Post*, January 8, 1967, wrote that "A failure to resolve the Rhodesian crisis with justice to the African majority would inevitably strengthen the hand of extremism, violence and racism in the heart of Africa."

Yet within Washington, there is a lobby to oppose sanctions, led by Senators Eastland (Miss.) and Fannin (Ariz.) and backed by Congressmen Utt and Younger (Calif.) and Gross (Iowa), linking the Southern Democrats with the ultra-conservative Republicans. Senator Dirksen's office has also been campaigning for the Eastland resolution to recognize the Smith Government and resume trade with Rhodesia.

Steps should be taken immediately, to increase the pressure on Rhodesia but with the recognition that the perpetuation of white supremacy in Rhodesia is largely dependent on its perpetuation in South Africa and the Portuguese colonies. No country can effectively attack the racist Smith regime while investing heavily in the rest of Southern Africa.

[This article is based on the February 1967 Fact Sheet on Rhodesia prepared by the American Committee on Africa. Supplementary information was taken from *The Failure of Sanctions Against Rhodesia and the Effect on African States: A Growing Racial Crisis* by George W. Shepherd, Jr. which appeared in the February-March issue of *Africa Today*.]

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Q. Is there anything that we in the United States can do to help FRELIMO and the national liberation movement of Mozambique?

A. There is much that you can do here. We believe that although the United States is slightly involved in Mozambique, the American people, who fought for their own liberation and established a democratic country, would like to see the people of Mozambique free. Americans should try to influence their government to change its policy with regard to our country. We would like the United States to exert economic and diplomatic pressure on Portugal to negotiate with FRELIMO. This would not be difficult because the United States is the "maximum exponent" in NATO and it is the NATO powers who are helping Portugal fight on so many fronts in Africa.

And finally, on an individual basis, you can help us with material as well as moral support. If you wish to donate money, clothing or medicine, please contact the FRELIMO office, 111 Third Avenue, Apt. 6K, New York, NY, 10003.

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Dominican Republic

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policy to the concrete demands of revolutionary war, the masses will run away from it. And leadership of the movement, by virtue of the very dynamics of the revolutionary process, might be seized by non-proletarian groups (in this case the alternative is the immediate defeat of the revolution or of the national liberation struggle). . . .

And so Dominican Communists, holding that the revolution remains on the order of the day, are actively preparing for armed struggle at all levels. For the same reason, we consider it important to conduct systematic preparation of the masses, because the Party's readiness for armed struggle does not signify yet that the masses will go over to it at the decisive moment. . . .

Now for another issue in the current debate. In principle, an armed revolutionary movement can start wherever the class struggle reaches the level of armed violence. However, in view of imperialism's interference in the internal affairs of our countries, it becomes necessary for Communists not only to lead the struggle born of a spontaneous aggravation of the social and political contradictions, but also to organize this struggle on their own initiative where, given proper preparation, a military organization of the masses can be created. Therefore systematic preparation for irregular struggle in rural areas is so important for the Communists of our country and for the majority of countries on our continent. . . .

Those who hope to accomplish the revolution in our countries without the rural masses will never secure its victory. But after a large-scale penetration by the "green berets" into the mountains of America it would be irresponsible, in our view, to try to win the masses for revolution solely through trade union or craft union methods of organization and education. (The effectiveness of other methods of revolutionary organization and education of the peasantry is evident in the experience of the Colombian Communists). The U.S. military presence in our mountains is an admission of the danger (to the enemy) and of the possibilities (for the revolution) inherent in the revolutionary struggle of the peasantry. But it also reminds of a serious weakness of the liberation movement—slow progress in drawing the exploited rural masses into the democratic and anti-imperialist struggle.

The need to involve the masses in this protracted action becomes increasingly clear, the action that can have the

character of resistance to the invader (or putschists) until conditions are created for a military-political offensive along the entire front of the revolution.

Although we regard the working people of our country and our Party as the base of the Dominican revolutionary process, we realize that it will be difficult to achieve victory in decisive battles against imperialism without militant international solidarity. The revolutionaries fighting against imperialist domination need the aid of the working-class and democratic movement in the developed capitalist countries, and the national-liberation and revolutionary movements in Africa, Asia and our Latin America.

Within the context of this general policy our Party is giving special attention to building a combat alliance with the Communists and people of Haiti fighting against the Duvalier dictatorship. This alliance makes much more feasible the defeat of the reactionary and imperialist forces in the two countries. . . .

The Dominican Communists are preparing for a new upsurge of revolution. They are elaborating the strategy and tactics of struggle against imperialism and its local allies in the new conditions; organizationally and technically preparing for this struggle; strengthening unity by isolating the professional splitters, and building a solid, durable alliance with all genuinely revolutionary forces, including the "new forces;" co-ordinating their actions with the struggles of the Communists and the people of Haiti and the revolutionaries of the continent. They are consolidating their party to play a bigger part in the revolution. . . . [from *World Marxist Review*, March 1968]

BIRTHDAY GREETINGS

This issue marks the first birthday of the Tri-Continental Information Bulletin. During this year, we have brought you the first U.S. publication of: the proposed U.S.-Panama Defense Treaty; the message from Regis Debray, smuggled out of his prison in Bolivia; the political program of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front; and Frantz Fanon on the Death of Lumumba. Hopefully, our pamphlet series of studies of national liberation movements can be brought to you in the immediate future. Please help up continue to bring you the most immediate and relevant information available. Send your contribution today.

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