

BULLETIN

25¢

VOL. I, NO. 8 December 1967

THE UNKNOWN WAR IN PORTUGUESE WEST AFRICA

Report on a Guerrilla War

WHAT I EXPECT OF MY FRIENDS

by Regis Debray

[The following statement, smuggled out of Debray's prison in Camiri, was printed in the French newspaper *Nouvel Observateur*, November 7, 1967. The editors did not reveal how the manuscript was obtained. The translation was done by a friend of the TCIC *Bulletin*.]

Although I do not belong to any Communist party, I do belong by belief and action to a revolutionary movement that bases itself on clandestine struggle. I have then the responsibilities of a militant. I am bound by a collective discipline, and as part of this movement I must act upon instructions received, and respect a plan of organization for the struggle. The paradox is that in an affair that has become, in spite of myself, scandalously publicized, I cannot act in a way that would enable me to efficiently use this publicity for the good of the revolution; for example, in admitting some responsibility in guerrilla organization, without simultaneously involving people and actions that are more important for the success of the revolution than publicity. If I should decide to take such a position then I would fall in the enemy's trap, which tries to spread propaganda that the Bolivian guerrilla movement is a plot hatched abroad by foreigners (as reactionaries always claim).

Why did they secretly keep me in prison for two months? In order to give the C.I.A. enough time to accomplish its mission. They (the C.I.A.) were either Puerto Ricans, Cuban exiles or Panamanians, who spoke English fluently as Spanish and who were clever enough to never reveal their identity or their nationality. Yet, it is perhaps the C.I.A., who arrived at Choretí the third day of my arrest, who saved my life! It was almost certainly the end for me. I had no more strength left and was surrounded by officers who were taking out their frustration on me. So excited that they were already shooting between my legs and close to my head. These "Messieurs" of the C.I.A. stopped all that, called a doctor, and in the beginning treated me with courtesy. They had a thick file on me, my vitae curriculum, where I had been the last two years, lists of my friends, etc. Of the guerrillas themselves, they already knew practically everything. They already had three prisoners, two of whom were deserters, some documents left in an abandoned camp (including the diary of a guerrilla). After three weeks they even exhibited photos of Che.

Thus it was not the physical presence of Che in Bolivia which was at the bottom of their questioning. That was well known. What interested them were the plans of the guerrillas, their contacts and how our meeting was arranged. Now, as a journalist, I did not have to know the organization of the guerrillas, the plans of Che or their national and international contacts. Therefore the interrogation bogged down. Because

—continued on page three

[The following article, published in the London *Times*, (November 10, 1967), was written by Basil Davidson, the highly-respected historian and student of Africa. The author spent much of October among nationalist guerrillas in the Portuguese colonial territory of Guinea-Bissau.]

Last night, I wrote in my diary for October 9 this year, we came up an arm of the creeks with a man pole-sounding on either beam while the Atlantic tide, a merest movement upon ripples the colour of dark violet beneath tropical stars, cradled our steel ship closer to the coastal wall of trees. It could not in this respect, I thought, have changed in centuries. Singing out in Guinea Creole—half a brass exactly, *me'ô bra'ô qui'do*—just such a voice would have patiently brought in the caravels of long ago. Otherwise the occasion belonged to a series of events altogether original among the creeks and seaways of the Guinea Coast. For our ship was the *Tres Agosto*, a stout little vessel with a multi-barrelled ack-ack cannon on the bow that is owned and operated by the African Independence Party of Guinea and the Cape Verdes (or P.A.I.G.C. in Portuguese); and what we were doing on board here was to make a routine landing, on guerrilla business, in the Portuguese colonial territory of Guinea-Bissau, a wedge of West African forest and savannah that is almost twice the size of Wales.

In the days that followed I marched in daylight across the Coastal region of Quitafine, floated through the night along wide sea-arms or inland channels, and inspected P.A.I.G.C. military bases, irregular formations Balante and Mandjak villages and peasants, and a great deal else connected with a vigorous national war of which the outside world seems to know little or nothing at all. I was present at no land action here between nationalists and Portuguese. But I witnessed several air bombardments of villages and ricefields by small jet bombers. They came over us in threes at a time, usually around 11 in the morning, and bombed from a prudent altitude of about 4,000 ft.

Mostly these raids were with high-explosive bombs. But on October 9 the Portuguese dropped napalm. One napalm canister made a lucky hit—"They've been trying for months," observed Amílcar Cabral, P.A.I.G.C. secretary-general, who was with me at the time—on a nationalist ack-ack emplacement, incinerating the gunner of a four-barrelled 14 m.m. cannon (I believe of Czechoslovak make), and wounding his mate. I saw its spume of thick black smoke, and next day I saw the casualty, a 23 year-old Balante peasant named Tangbata, lying with bandaged arms and legs in a guerrilla hospital not far from Cacine. I also photographed fragments of a canister which had failed to explode. For the benefit of those who understand more about these things, I noted that one of these fragments was printed FCM-1-55 NAPALM 300KG-350L M/61. So far as I know the Portuguese import their napalm, like their jet bombers, from NATO allies.

—continued on page two

BASIL DAVIDSON REPORTS FROM 'PORTUGUESE' GUINEA

—continued from page one

Later in October I went into this Portuguese colony with mobile P.A.I.G.C. units at two points in the north-east. Here the rain forest gives way to broad savannah, and tall yellow grass covers a land glittering with rivers at this season of the year. On the first of these sorties we simply drove across the frontier in a Soviet-made lorry to visit Fulah frontier villages (Vendu-Leidi, Burculem, Tabada, Dalaba) which the Portuguese had bombed a couple weeks earlier. Thirty or so villagers walked in from their fields for a long way round to greet us, and were disappointed when we would not stay to eat the goats they wanted to kill for our dinner. It seemed clear, as in the south, that the Portuguese policy of intimidation by bombing had failed to work here, and had merely opened still more widely the cleft between these Fulah peasants and the Portuguese. At first they had been frightened; but contempt and hatred of the Portuguese had followed panic, and had stayed.

On another entry, somewhat farther south, I walked into the grasslands with Oswaldo, P.A.I.G.C. Commander in this sector and one of the movement's outstanding military leaders. I came to know him well. At 28 he already has four years of tough fighting behind him, and, like Cabral and others I met, is calmly confident about the future. A shrewd and forceful man of Bissau, the country's capital, Oswaldo spent six months in China during 1961 but is otherwise, so far as I could judge, perfectly characteristic of this movement's emphatically national and indigenous nature and trend of thought. With Oswaldo and a small guard patrol I marched inland to a military headquarters near the beleaguered Portuguese garrison of Beli. There I found some 30 veterans and recruits under a local commander named Yamte Niaga, a Balante like many of the others in this war against colonial rule. They were waiting for the rains to finish, and the rivers to go down, before embarking on another season's active warfare.

Altogether I made only three entries and travelled inside the country no more than some 80 miles, mostly on foot. Other observers, Dutch, French, American, and Italian, have gone in and out at other points in the past year or so. I think it may now be accepted that the Portuguese no longer have any hold on four-fifths of their land frontiers or about half their coastline, now firmly in guerrilla hands. Portugal's garrison in the country, believed to be about 30,000 metropolitan troops buttressed by about 3,000 African mercenaries, has otherwise managed to keep all the towns, and to maintain some 40 isolated posts in rural areas.

On their side the P.A.I.G.C., probably with fewer than 3,000 men in regular formations shaped initially in 1964, and with perhaps twice as many more in guerrilla units, now claim a practically undisputed possession of rather more than half the villages and rural areas. They say they operate successfully with mobile or guerrilla units in most of the rest of the country, and are now beginning to close in on all but the biggest two or three towns. I think these claims are in no way exaggerated. Morale appears a great deal better on the nationalist side, and the Portuguese seem completely to have lost the initiative in the field. Portuguese garrisons which I circled myself were said by local P.A.I.G.C. commanders to have given up all action by sortie for more than a mile or so outside their ramparts, and that rarely; and I think this is true. These garrisons are frequently attacked by 82 m.m. mortars and small cannon. Many of them, I was told, are now supplied only by helicopter and parachute.

Rear support from the neighboring republics of Guinea and

Senegal helps to explain some of this success. Thanks to it, P.A.I.G.C. commanders can move their military and civilian supplies across the frontier with no difficulty except means of transport. They bring in their heavier weapons in this way, and take out fairly large quantities of rice, kola and palm products which they buy from the peasants in their liberated areas in exchange for imported cottons and other goods. They use this rice to feed their own troops and to buy foreign-made cottons. I was able to inspect several of their field depots, and to look at detailed statements of account.

Yet these external bases, judging again by what I saw for myself, are now of no more than secondary significance. This is a fighting movement which has taken deep root within the country after years of political discussion at village level. It can now undoubtedly rely upon widespread peasant support; and it is commanded with great determination from inside. The "rear bases" continue to be useful, but they are no longer essential. I think the same is true of the wider question of military supplies and civilian training facilities provided chiefly by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the German Democratic Republic. The very able secretary-general of the P.A.I.G.C., Amilcar Cabral, told me that the P.A.I.G.C. now have 470 men and women in training in Europe as doctors, nurses, mechanics, electricians, agronomists, and the like. But it will be wrong to see this movement, though undoubtedly inspired by ideas of revolutionary socialism, as anything but staunchly independent. It will be equally wrong to see it as "somehow Portuguese" because of the Portuguese names of most of its leaders—names which derive, in fact, from the old days of slavery and servitude.

I was able to have many talks, often lasting for long hours of the kind of waiting especially imposed by this kind of warfare, with Cabral himself, a 40 year-old hydraulics engineer trained in Lisbon; with Aristide Pereira, in charge of security and intelligence; with sector commanders like Oswaldo in the north and Nino in the south; and with lesser commanders and political commissars such as the similarly youthful Mateus and Pasquale in Quintafine. The constant emphasis which came through these talks was one of stout autonomy of mind and clarity of purpose along the lines of building in their native land an entirely new structure of social life, utterly different from the structure of colonial times; but also of a strong determination to avoid, if they can, any kind of bureaucratic imposition, whether revolutionary in form or not. I found them brave and honest men who mean to build something fresh in this country which, with good reason, they confidently expect to carry through to independence.

Published monthly by: Tri-continental Information Center,
1133 Broadway—Room 640, New York, New York, 10010.
(212) 242-6512. Subscriptions: \$3.00, U.S.; \$3.50, Canada
and Mexico;

Postage rates pending at New York, N.Y.

Editors: Michael Myerson, John Gallo

All articles are the responsibility of the editors.

Tri-Continental Information Center sponsors:

Franklin Alexander	Frank Emspak	Frank Kofsky
Donna Allen	Abe Feinglass	Paul Krassner
James S. Allen	Robert Fitch	Sidney Lens
Herbert Aptheker	Richard Flacks	Michael Locker
M.S. Arnoni	D.F. Fleming	Lincoln Lynch
James Aronson	Andre Gunder Frank	John McDermott
Rev. Lee H. Ball	Tona de Gomez	Rev. Wm. H. Melish
Norma Becker	Maxwell Geismar	Jack Minnis
Alvah Bessie	John Gerassi	Tito Nolasco
Carl Bloice	Marvin Gittleman	James O'Connor
Robert S. Browne	Fred Goff	Sidney Peck
Ron Clark	Carlton Goodlett	Peter Steffens
Ernest DeMaia	Robert Gover	Albert Szent-Gyorgyi
Ruby Dee	Rev. Thomas Lee Hayes	Rev. Willard Uphouse
Douglas Dowd		

A MESSAGE FROM REGIS DEBRAY

—continued from page one

they were not interested in accusing Debray but in accusing Cuba through Debray. Not once in two months did they ever accuse me of being a guerrilla. They knew very well, from my background and how I was arrested, that I was going to La Paz. And if I was involved, it was perhaps only as an envoy. But about what? For whom? The Bolivian government left me in the hands of the C.I.A. with the hope that through them they would obtain the sensational confession that I was an envoy of Fidel, an international spy for Cuba, and other nonsense.

Such a confession would enable them to put up a beautiful exhibition against Cuba and against Fidel. However, they could prove nothing. The ritual of the interrogation—first a slap, then bargaining, threatening my life, then a package of cigarettes—finally exhausted itself in interminable recitations of my *Vitae Curriculum*, the story that I'm a journalist sent by Maspero [a French leftist publisher]. The trial against Cuba therefore failed. They were forced to put Debray on trial, since they could not get the hoped for confession. . . .

At the end of June, before the visit of the hypocritical American bishop, I asked myself why they had not liquidated me. I did not know what was happening in the outside world, about all the interventions in my favor, and the newspaper publicity that my case was receiving. When I was first imprisoned, it was too soon; I had not yet "confessed." As I was told by the mysterious Dr. Gonzalez (a C.I.A. man who directed the investigation), "You interest them more alive than dead." However, when it was clear that I would not "confess" as hoped, it was too late. World opinion had been aroused. Too many witnesses had seen me alive; it would also be necessary to liquidate my fellow prisoners Bustos and above all Roth, whose death could not be justified. Today my liquidation seems quite unlikely. However, there is still the possibility of an accident after the trial, instigated by the C.I.A. and the "Second Section" which operates as a parallel network to the military and public authorities. . . .

Perhaps people will be misled by my denying to be a guerrilla. The bourgeois press, nourished by the unfortunate declarations of my parents, have taken a statement of the fact that I am not a guerrilla and turned it into a statement of principle. They claim the man of letters has the right not to bear arms, that it is an impossibility of nature, that the revolutionary intellectual is exempted from active service to the revolution and that the "writer" should not dirty his hands by touching a gun. Which amounts to something like, "My son is not a bandit. Who do you think he is? He is an honest boy, etc." This is simply ridiculous. When one has written what I have written, one must necessarily, of a theoretical and moral necessity, become one day or another an ordinary combatant. Without gun, bad pen; without pen, bad gun. Thus they cannot make me look like a good-natured soul, head in the clouds, who due to his "generosity" happened to find himself in the mountains. It was the needs of the struggle and the momentary division of the work that had to be done, which prevented me from being a combatant, and from definitely incorporating myself into the E.L.N. [Bolivian guerrilla movement]. . . .

I come to a painful matter: the lamentable, ignoble publicity with which the bourgeois press has given my situation. They have deformed and disimulated it into a personal affair, without dwelling at all on its historical meaning. They have taken honest concern for me and turned it into maudlin sentiment. Which is a clever cover-up, a maneuver of our adversaries which we must denounce and destroy. Their aim is to make the world ignore the class struggle in Bolivia and everywhere, and my reason for being here. . . .

I ask then of my friends that the "Debray Affair" be put in its true perspective. Instead of serving as an opportunity for good consciences to demonstrate their indignation, or as a source of income for the magazines that must arouse weekly the emotions of their readers; instead, the "Debray Affair" must be used to wake up world opinion to the general problems of the Americas, of the struggle, of the new Yankee fascism. So don't let's talk so much about Debray, who is very much alive for the moment, more photographed in his defendant's box than a whoreish movie starlette; but let us remember the Bolivian guerrillas and the others, those who died in combat and those who survived and are now fighting under enormously difficult conditions. Let us tell about the miners, victims of silicosis and massacre by the Bolivian army. In order to apply the ideas of Fidel and Che (creating several Vietnams to save Vietnam and to defeat once and for all those who created the Vietnam war), it does not require super-men. But each of us must have a deal of abnegation: to renounce everything and perhaps even one's life, to endure, to be stubborn and to have a stomach that can be empty for weeks.

We must speak of all this and not of one condemned man among thousands who is assured of sleeping and eating at his ease for a good many years. With Greece and its colonels, Latin America and its generals, Vietnam and Westmoreland, with all these big issues, my case should be as small as a needle in the haystack. If a "Committee for Debray" still exists, it would be worthwhile to narrow its scope, so as to change its character and convert it into a "Committee for the American Revolution," or something similar. The specific tasks that must be done are not lacking. I will try some other time to describe them.

CHE'S FIELD DIARY ALTERED BY CIA

[In an article appearing in the Mexican magazine *Siempre*, journalist Luis Suarez charged that the C.I.A. has been altering the field diary of Che Guevara. The following excerpts are from Suarez's article as reprinted in *Granma Weekly Review* (Havana), December 3, 1967.]

". . . The changes made in the diary . . . are intended to blemish his [Che's] pure spirit and his revolutionary integrity, presenting him as an inept leader who indiscreetly mentioned names, characteristics and distinguishing marks of those with whom he worked, thus, through lack of foresight, turning into an informer.

"The Bolivian-U.S. repressive apparatus has embellished Che's diary with names and details to justify the attacks it is now levying against many persons belonging to the opposition, accused, on the basis of such 'irrefutable' evidence, of having belonged to the guerrilla apparatus . . . Its pages have been altered by C.I.A. experts in psychological propaganda who add what they deem necessary to discredit Che and use his diary as a basis for division and enmity within the democratic and anti-imperialist forces in Bolivia and throughout Latin America . . .

"Who could possibly believe that Che Guevara, so careful to protect his comrades-in-arms, and to use codes, would write the real and complete names of his comrades in the struggle in the rear guard, where it is so much easier to be identified and eliminated? In the paragraphs published up to now there appear real names alongside aliases, as if anonymity were tactically advisable for some but not for others, though all are part of the same apparatus of struggle, on different fronts.

—continued on page four

THE SITUATION IN PERU

American press coverage of the situation in Peru can only be described as fantasy and fiction. Doves of Peace Corps volunteers scattered over the landscape, busily instructing the ignorant peasants how to build a clean, plentiful world. American investments and "aid", slowly but surely helping the country become better, more modern in every way. All that is asked of the American people at home is that they be patient, do not ask any questions and believe what is told them. After such a steady diet of lies, the truth of what is actually happening in Peru sounds equally unbelievable. The constant drain of interest and profits from American "aid" leaving the country are bleeding Peru white. Every day the situation gets worse, not better. There is famine and widespread unemployment, uncontrollable inflation, and to keep the Peruvian people in line, a government that is nothing less than a tyrannical dictatorship. Yes, there is a guerrilla movement in Peru, and Peruvian miners are arming themselves. Why? Because their situation is so desperate that they've come to accept G. B. Shaw's statement that "Nothing is done in this world until men are prepared to kill one another if it is not done."

The following facts, excerpted from *Solidarite perou* (September, 1967), describe the conditions in present-day Peru.

Miners' strike

"300 miners from Cerro de Pasco, situated 313 kilometers from Lima, arrived in the capital after 180 hours of marching. The miners undertook this long trek to protest their low salaries. In coming to the Peruvian capital, they took one of the highest roads in the world (5,000 meters). One baby died during the procession (many women took part) and five miners had to be hospitalized on arrival. The miners were received by students and union delegates who declared that unless the miners received immediate satisfaction, they would go on a hunger strike."

From the Middle Ages

"When Hector Cordero, Peruvian journalist, was kidnapped in plain daylight on a Lima street, his friends tried their best to find out his whereabouts. They asked for him in all the government prisons, but the police pretended to know nothing about him. Meanwhile, Cordero was brought to Callao (port of Lima) where he was locked in a dark prison cell. There he was interrogated by members of the intelligence service of the Civil Guard, and of SIN (national intelligence service). For several days he was questioned in almost complete darkness, with only a reflector shining on his face, while his interrogators had their faces hidden behind black masks.

This method from the Middle Ages is used in Peru, especially when torturing a suspect, so that later the victims, should they come out alive, cannot say who their torturers were. It was only eight days afterwards that Cordero was brought to Lima and incarcerated at Sexto, then in the prison of San Quentin."

Preventive Defense

"Technicians of the International Petroleum Company have become man hunters in the virgin forests of Madre de Dios. They are hunting the peaceful Indians of the Amahuacas tribe. Owners of lumberjacking firms in the region have testified that the Indians have never been hostile to them. The American technicians have already killed 20 and wounded hundreds in surprise attacks on the Indian Villages. They

claim such action is necessary, so that the Indians will be purged of any thoughts of attacking them! M. Harten, a sawmill owner, who for ten years has had only peaceful relations with the Indians, has complained to the authorities about the butchery. He is afraid that the Indians will be provoked into taking revenge. (They are experts with the bow and arrow). The Americans justify their killings, labeling it 'preventive defense.'

"Ignoring the fate of the Indians, there is no doubt that the 'free world' guarantees complete freedom to the American employees to promote the profits of their company."

Famine in Puno

"At least ten people are already dead of starvation in the region of Puno. The misery is such that mothers sell their children because they no longer can feed them. Many families are getting ready to leave their homes. 'We must migrate to the coast, or else die here'. Many young girls run away from home to take up prostitution in the big cities."

Economic Crisis in Peru

"The growth out of all proportion of bureaucratic jobs in the Government, and an augmentation of the military budget, under the pretext of defense against neighboring countries (when in reality the army is directed against the Peruvian people), has provoked a deficit in the budget, one that can only lead to inflation. Such a crisis is only aggravated by foreign investments of capital in Peru, which concentrate on the non-productive aspects of the Peruvian economy.

"The exporters, the barons of sugar, cotton and fish flour, who are the most powerful sector of the Peruvian economy, and at the same time the most reactionary, started to conspire among themselves. A devaluation would be the most favorable for them. They sell in dollars and pay their workers in Peruvian soles.

CHE'S DIARY — continued from page four

"In these paragraphs, for example, mention is made of journalist Gonzalo Lopez Munoz, who was Press Secretary of the Bolivian Presidency, a rightist belonging to the group of Walter Guevara, recently appointed Foreign Minister in the reorganized Barrientos Administration... Taking it for an established fact that Che Guevara mentioned Lopez Munoz in his diary as a follower, the journalist has been arrested. In Bolivia it is felt that the motives for this specific maneuver are within the play of factions within the Bolivian Government, and, of course, that the maneuver is designed to intimidate intellectual circles, keep them from expressing themselves, that it is a warning to them as well as to journalists who sympathize in the slightest with the opposition.

"The hand of the expert is seen, moreover, in the fact that the supposed excerpts from the field diary—with names added on the top floor of the U.S. Embassy—were not published all at once, but in dribbles. First they publish excerpts from the diary, and, when the repressive apparatus has done its dirty work, other excerpts from the diary appear with new names. In this way repression is methodically carried out and no one knows whether or not his name will appear in the field diary the next day. Many people in Bolivia live under the shadow of this doubt.

"Meanwhile, special agents of the Bolivian police have been sent to various Latin American capitals to maintain special vigilance over Bolivian 'contacts' or those of other nationalities, once again citing so-called references by Che Guevara. "But history is not written in a day, much less with falsifications of the diary of Che Guevara, whose figure, despite this dirty maneuver, still sits proud in the saddle throughout Latin America."

URUGUAY: MODEL STATE IN A PICKLE

[The following is from *Granma Weekly Review* (Havana), November 12, 1967.]

Last week [the end of October] Uruguay, the so-called "Switzerland of the Americas", was precipitated into one of the most violent political and economic crises that has occurred on this continent in recent years.

That country was shaken by two general strikes: one staged by the interurban bus workers and the other by workers of the nation's telegraph and telex services. The Bank of the Republic closed down operations on Wednesday, a measure believed to be a prelude to a new devaluation of the Uruguayan peso. The present official exchange rate is listed as 99 pesos to the dollar, but the black market rate is 150 pesos to the dollar.

This was the last straw. Strikes broke out in a number of work sectors; protests came from hospitalized patients; nine of the nation's eleven papers have been closed down for more than three months; various private and public enterprises closed down for shortage of funds; the slaughter of cattle was suspended for a month; and a staggering rise in the cost of living occurred. All these factors combined to force the government of President Oscar Gestido to declare a state of siege last month.

Nonetheless, this measure, taken with the declared purpose of confronting the problem of stoppages in public and private activities throughout the nation, and providing the government with a breathing spell in which to attempt to solve the urgent economic problems, brought on a serious ministerial crisis resulting in the resignation of five ministers and a functionary with the rank of minister. Gestido needed more than twenty days to reorganize his cabinet. Nonetheless, the unity of the Partido Colorado, which brought him to power, was shaken to its roots.

Since January 1, the Uruguayan peso has been devalued seven times—four times during Gestido's term of office. Inflation continues to increase. In only a few months' time bus fares have risen by 400 percent, and further increases are expected. According to official figures, the cost of living has increased by more than 80 percent in the last nine months. The so-called "deterioration of the terms of exchange," a critical factor in Uruguay's foreign trade, forces the country to export more and more and receive less and less.

This tragic situation has its paradoxical side. It is estimated that members of the Uruguayan oligarchy have between 300 and 500 million dollars stashed away in accounts outside the country. A few months ago ex-Minister of the Treasury Vasconcellos was begging them for 60 million in an attempt to solve the nation's crisis.

This crisis has come to be practically a vicious circle, in which each new phase represents yet another blow for Uruguay's working class. For example, in the last ten years nominal salaries have increased by 940 percent, but the cost of living has increased by 1085 percent during the same period. This represents a 13 percent decrease in the real wages of workers.

A new shadow has appeared to make this picture even darker: the interest of the Argentine and Brazilian military sectors in the Uruguayan crisis. The *Evening Star* recently stated that a secret unwritten agreement exists between Brazil and Argentina to intervene in Uruguay if the present crisis worsens. In Brazil *Correio da Manhã* published the text of a pamphlet issued to officers of the Brazilian Navy entitled

Uruguay, Subversion Mart, indicating that the neighboring gorrillas are alerted, are watching the deterioration of the situation in Uruguay intently, and are prepared to intervene in that small nation at the least sign of "subversion."

A "sword of Damocles" hangs over the grave scene of crisis in Uruguay.

DOLDRUMS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Last May the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security issued a report which warned that the threat of "Communism" (i.e., popular revolution) was "as grave now as it was in the early nineteen-fifties," when the movement was brutally crushed. *NY Times*, May 13, 1967.) A month earlier, Philippine "intelligence" officers had reported that the Huks, as the guerrillas are called, had 156 "regular" troops and 136 part-time guerrillas in Central Luzon, the largest and most important island in the archipelago. "They are believed, however, to have almost 1,000 legal, or political, members and more than 26,000 rural supporters, nearly half the peasant supporters they enjoyed at the height of the Huk insurgency in the nineteen-fifties." In April the Huks were believed to have already achieved working political control of much of Central Luzon. (*NY Times*, April 17, 1967.)

The growing strength of the guerrillas and the deterioration of the Philippine economic and political structure are causing increased concern among U.S. and Philippine Officials. The conditions against which the guerrillas are struggling were candidly described in the November 13 issue of the *U.S. News & World Report*:

Economic growth over the last decade has averaged less than 5% per year. Last year there was a 4.2% increase, but the population increased by 3.5%. Chronic unemployment is at least 12%. Income per capita is \$100 a year. ". . . a privileged 1.1% of Filipino families enjoy incomes of \$5,000 a year or more—and the gap between rich and poor is widening steadily. This recently led President Marcos to warn Filipinos that they are 'literally living on top of a social volcano that can erupt any day.'"

"Smuggling has become big business, and at the top of it are found Congressmen, provincial Governors, bureaucrats and police. The Secretary of Finance admits that half his officials are 'hopelessly' corrupt, and others are 'corrupt but potentially reformable.' The national Police Commissioner calls 70 per cent of the police corrupt, inept or both. . . Elections, Filipinos complain, are won with bribery and gunfire. Political office, they say has become an 'investment' that pays handsome dividends to the successful candidate."

U.S. firms have invested nearly \$600 million. The U.S. takes 40% of the Philippine's exports and supplies 1/3 of its imports. "U.S. Government spending here, mostly on military bases, equals one quarter of the Philippine's budget." The 4 big U.S. military installations "are all of major importance to American forces fighting in Vietnam."

The magazine mentions as "hopes" and "opportunities" the jobs "created" by a number of industries, such as cattle-raising, and the growing and processing of pineapples and bananas, that have been established by the Honolulu-based Castle & Cooke, Inc. "At the moment, however, such hopes are outweighed by the growing worry that the nation's deep-seated ills will become dominant. Should that happen [!], then the United States is likely to find itself involved in still another trouble spot in Southeast Asia."

REPORT FROM HANOI

"Before coming to Hanoi, I was very skeptical about North Vietnam's claims concerning planes shot down. In Hanoi itself, after having observed air raids from favorable lookout points, and after comparing my figures with other non-communist journalists who observed the same raids from other points in the city, I am infinitely less skeptical. American plane losses here are huge. American pilots sent over Hanoi must have the impression of being sent to a sort of suicide. Formations of four planes, before our very eyes, have 50% losses just over the sky of Hanoi. Others arrive at the capital with 3 planes. At a stupefying cadence, Sam rockets rise slowly, often in clusters toward the approaching planes. The motto here of "one Sam, one plane" is surely not realized, but they are coming very close to it. They are not so outmoded, these Sams!"

"After the raids, North Vietnamese are very anxious for news; plane losses and especially civilian casualties. During the raids Radio Hanoi broadcasts the planes shot down as they descend: 'One May Bay, two May Bay,' I have often been able to see with my own eyes and ears that their figures were exact."

"An example of cowardice: the Americans take advantage of the arrival of the plane from the International Control Commission, to launch their raids as the plane is coming into Hanoi. The radio ceaselessly repeats, 'Attention! Attention! Do not aim at the civilian plane with the green and red lights!' This American tactic of using the ICC for cover can be described as nothing short of despicable."

"The 'American Invincibility': is it a myth as long as they do not employ their atomic bombs? Do you doubt it? Then why do they so outrageously lie, reduce their announced losses to 16 planes, and claim 22 MIGs down, when the North Vietnamese announce 36 American planes downed? This sunny morning as the MIGs parade in formation above the Hanoi sky, there must be many funeral services aboard the aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet, in the bases of Thailand, Ubon Udorn and elsewhere." (An eye witness report by Olivier Todd, who spent 3 weeks in Hanoi and North Vietnam. This account was printed in the *Nouvel Observateur*, November 7, 1967.)

Dissension

According to the press agency of the South Vietnamese NLF, on October 27, 12 G.I.s onboard an armored car leading a convoy of 12 vehicles in a raiding operation in Cholon province jumped out of the car and set fire to it. This occurred after the soldiers in the leading car refused to move forward and carry out the raid. All of the weapons and munitions in the burned car exploded. The raid was called off. (*Vietnam Information Bulletin* (Rangoon), November 15, 1967.)

Deception

As of November 27, the U.S. Government reported that 757 U.S. planes had been shot down over North Vietnam during the war. (*NYT*, November 28.) However, the North Vietnamese claim that 2,597 U.S. planes had been brought down up to November 22. (*Vietnam Information Bulletin*, November 25.)

Disaster

The People's Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam (P.L.A.F.) summarized the victories recorded in July, August and September of this year. According to their figures, they inflicted casualties of over 82,000 enemy troops, including 32,500 G.I.s and 3,000 satellite troops. Besides, the P.L.A.F. shot down or destroyed on the ground, during those three months, 747 aircraft, wrecked or damaged 1,180 military vehicles, destroyed 133 artillery pieces, sank 76 military boats and launches, overturned 8 locomotives and 20 carriages, razed 94 posts, destroyed or damaged 71 watch towers, blew up 78 bridges and 67 culverts, and set ablaze 52 ammunition dumps and 19 storages with 18 million litres of gasoline. (*Vietnam Information Bulletin*, November 1.) Victories in October and November have been even more spectacular.

Defeat

"Having sustained heavy losses, the U.S. aggressors have been driven into a passive posture on all battlefields, especially in Quang Tri-Thua Thien. They have lost much of their punch and their defensive position has become unsteady. The Saigon puppet army has failed in its pacification job and has disintegrated morally and organizationally. The enemy's rear remained upset." (*ibid.*)

..... Enclosed is \$..... for..... subscription(s) to the ICIC Bulletin.
(\$3.00, U.S.; \$3.50, Canada & Mexico; \$5.00, other foreign)

..... Enclosed is \$..... as a contribution to the Center.

..... I wish to receive more information about the Center.


..... Here are some activity suggestions, additional domestic and/or foreign contacts for the mailing list, etc.

My name.....

My address..... Zip.....

TRI-CONTINENTAL
INFORMATION CENTER

1133 Broadway, Room 640
New York, New York 10010



Joe Shaver
P.O. Box 485
Cambridge, Mass 02139